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Relations between the United States
of America and Italy in the post-
Cold War period: a defense-
industrial perspective
Alessandro Marrone and Alessandro R. Ungaro
1 This paper focuses on the relations between the United States of America and Italy in
the post-Cold War period from the perspective of defense procurement and industrial
cooperation in relation to the strong military and political relationship between the
two countries. It will consider how the concentration and internationalization of the
Italian defense industry –epitomized by the build-up of Finmeccanica as a global player
in  the  defense  market–  is  related  to  U.S.-Italian  relations  in  defense.  Procurement
programs  involving  American  and  Italian  governments  will  be  analysed,  with  a
particular focus on the F-35 aircraft, together with the penetration of U.S. markets by
Italian defense companies such as AgustaWestland and Fincantieri.  This cooperation
relied on an important Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the United
States and Italy already in 1978, which established the necessary political and security
frameworks for procurement programs and cooperation activities. 
2 Such a defense-industrial perspective should not be isolated from broader military and
political relations between the United States and Italy, which have been particularly
important in terms of Italy’s contribution to U.S.-led military operations in Europe,
Central  Asia  and  the  enlarged  Mediterranean.1 Indeed,  the  final  part  of  the  paper
argues that there is a two-way relationship between defense-industrial and politico-
military cooperation. 
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The concentration and internationalization of the
Italian defense industry
3 Since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  Italian  defense  industry  has  experienced  two
complementary  phases:  concentration  and  internationalization.  The  latter  can  be
further divided into two specific moments: the European phase of internationalization
and the transatlantic one. A detailed analysis of the entire process through which the
Italian defense industrial base developed and expanded lies beyond the scope of this
paper. The focus will rather be on the fundamental steps related to the concentration
and  internationalization  of  the  Italian  defense  industry,  and  in  particular  of
Finmeccanica as the eighth-largest company in aerospace, defense and security.2 
4 In the early 1990s, the Italian defense industry was very fragmented in a constellation
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) without the presence of a big national defense
company able to compete on the international market. It suffered from duplication and
experienced  an  over-reliance  on  the  domestic  market  as  well  as  on  multinational
defense  programs  based  on  the  principle  of  juste  retour.3 The  majority  of  business
activities  were  civilian-oriented  and  almost  all  companies  had  deep  roots  in  the
domestic market with a limited international business perspective. 
5 Entering the market of other Western countries was rather difficult, as the two major
industrial  players  –EFIM4 and  IRI 5–  were  until  the  early  1990s  totally  owned  and
controlled by the State, establishing a direct fil  rouge between companies’ industrial
strategies and Italy’s defense and foreign policy. Both EFIM and IRI were state-owned
conglomerates holding the majority of Italian aerospace and defense companies. For
instance, EFIM owned, among others, the helicopter manufacturer Agusta, the defense
company Oto Melara and the electronic enterprise Officine Galileo. The IRI subsidiary
STET6 held enterprises with specializations in security and defense electronics such as
Selenia,  Elsag  and SGS  Thomson.  At  that  time,  Finmeccanica  was  an  IRI  subsidiary
holding  three  main  companies:  Aeritalia,  Alfa  Romeo  (later  acquired  by  Fiat)  and
Ansaldo. 
6 Such  a  fragmented  industrial  landscape  gradually  changed  in  ten  years,  as  the
concentration phase started in 1992. The process was not easy, due to strong political
and industrial interests in maintaining the status quo of a plurality of small and medium
enterprises totally controlled by EFIM and IRI.7 However, the objective of creating the
so-called  “national  champion”  prevailed,  and  in  May  1993  an  industrial  plan  was
approved to take advantage of all possible synergies between Finmeccanica and EFIM
companies.  In  particular,  Finmeccanica  had  direct  interests  in  twenty-eight  of  the
about 100 EFIM companies. Among these, Agusta, Siai Marchetti, Oto Melara, Officine
Galileo,  Breda  Meccanica  Bresciana  and  Sma  were  acquired  by  Finmeccanica.  The
company then undertook a privatization process in 1993, when it  was listed on the
Milan Stock Exchange.8 
7 The  rationale  behind  this  decisive  step  towards  the  rationalization  of  the  Italian
defense industry was delineated by Fabiano Fabiani,  chief executive officer (CEO) of
Finmeccanica in those crucial years. In September 1993 Fabiani explained the idea to
move  from a  fragmented  and  inefficient  business  logic  with  several  uncoordinated
companies  to  a  more  integrated  and efficient  industrial  group able  to  compete  on
European and international markets.9 During a hearing at the Senate commission in
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charge of supervising the privatization of state-owned companies, Fabiani introduced
the  company’s  strategic  guidelines  by  identifying  the  core  business  areas  in  which
Finmeccanica  would  allocate  the  majority  of  its  financial  and  human  resources:
aerospace and defense. Fabiani also declared his intention to complete the company’s
consolidation on the domestic market and then enter the international one.10 
8 Meanwhile,  the  restructuring  and  rationalization  of  the  Italian  defense  industry
proceeded and the internationalization phase took its first steps. This process can be
outlined by dividing it into two lines of action: a European phase of internationalization
and  a  transatlantic  one.  They  are  not  separated  but  rather  complementary  and
consecutive.11 The first line of action can be linked to the lead of Alberto Lina as CEO of
Finmeccanica since 1997 and was mainly characterized by a business model centred on
the creation of  joint  ventures  and partnerships  with European companies.  Such an
industrial  strategy  seems  to  coincide  with  strong  political  activism  by  Italian
governments at a European level12 in a period when many states in Europe were led by
progressives.  The  analysis  of  Finmeccanica’s  European  partnerships  is  beyond  the
scope of this paper. We will  only state that, as of 2012, the company accounted for
21 percent  of  the  Eurofighter  consortium  and  25 percent  of  the  European  missile
producer MBDA, in both cases with EADS and BAE Systems as major shareholders, and
had constituted two joint ventures with Thales producing space assets and services:
Thales Alenia Space, 67 percent owned by Thales, and Telespazio, 67 percent owned by
Finmeccanica.13 
9 During the transatlantic phase, instead, Finmeccanica seemed more inclined to develop
partnerships  and  penetrate  the  two  most  important  Atlantic  defense  markets,  the
United States and the United Kingdom. This period could be linked to the lead of Pier
Francesco Guarguaglini as CEO of the Italian defense company since 2002. Finmeccanica
started to refine its international strategy in order to achieve a leadership position in
certain  sectors.14 Such  a  strategy  implied  a  different  course  of  action  in  terms  of
alliances and JVs. Previously, the Italian company took part in several European and
international partnerships, but it had always played a junior role without aspiring to a
leading  position.  Under  the  leadership  of  Guarguaglini,  one  of  the  main  industrial
objectives was to reverse this trend through two industrial policies: acquiring, where
possible and in line with overall strategy, the entire equity stake of particular JVs; and
moving towards the establishment of equal partnership in specific defense sectors in
which Finmeccanica would have decided to play a more decisive role on a case by case
basis.15 
10 In  this  context,  two  of  the  most  important  business  operations  carried  out  by
Finmeccanica have regarded the United Kingdom, paving the way for penetration in
the U.S.  defense market.  In 2004, Finmeccanica acquired the shares held by the UK
company GKN of the JV AgustaWestland, established when Alberto Lina was the CEO of
Finmeccanica.  Through  this  decision,  Finmeccanica  became  sole  owner  of  the
helicopter company, ensuring a leading position in one of the most dynamic industrial
sectors crossing the defense and civilian markets. The total amount of the operation
was estimated at around $1.5 billion, one-tenth of the whole turnover of the industrial
group.16
11 The second key step concerned the defense electronics sector. After long negotiations
with the British counterpart BAE Systems, Finmeccanica created two companies, totally
owned and controlled by the Italian company: Selex Communications and Selex Sistemi
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Integrati. Moreover, in the aviation field, Finmeccanica and BAE Systems established
the  JV  Selex  Sensors  Airborne  Systems  with  a  shares  division  of  75 percent  and
25 percent,  respectively.17 In  other  words,  the  United  Kingdom  became  the  second
“domestic  market”  of  Finmeccanica,  with  more  than  9,000 employees,  and
Finmeccanica  became  the  second  major  supplier  for  the  UK  MoD.  As  affirmed  by
Guarguaglini,  these  two  decisive  business  achievements  represented  a  privileged
channel  in  order  to  further  improve  Finmeccanica’s  position  in  the  U.S.  defense
market.18 
 
Defense procurement and industrial cooperation
between the United States and Italy
12 U.S. political and industrial attention in Italy’s defense sector has been constant since
the  end  of  World  War II,  in  particular  regarding  the  aeronautic  sector.  High-level
contacts as well as partnerships and cooperation agreements with Lockheed Martin,
McDonnell Douglas and later with Boeing were established during the Cold War. For
example, the F-104S Starfighter was a licensed Italian version of the Lockheed F-104
Starfighter, which served in Italy’s Air Force from the late 1960s until the late 1990s. 
13 In  the  post-Cold  War  period,  defense  industrial  relations  between  Rome  and
Washington included two important elements: first, relevant procurement programs,
both concluded and still ongoing, such as the C130J and C27J Spartan transport aircraft,
the KC-767 tanker, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and, above all,
the  F-35  fighter  aircraft;  second,  the  penetration  of  U.S.  defense  markets  by
Finmeccanica, AgustaWestland and Fincantieri. 
 
The aerial triad and the A400M 
14 A first relevant case regarded two military transport aircraft –the Lockheed Martin
C-130J and the Alenia C-27J Spartan. In August 2000 the Italian Air Force received its
first C-130J with the primary intent of supporting the intervention of Italian troops in
missions abroad, as well as transporting personnel contaminated by biological agents.
In order to continue the modernization process started with the C-130J, in early 2000
Italy also ordered twelve C-27J transport aircraft from Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical
Transport  Systems (LMATTS),  a  company  equally  owned  by  Lockheed  Martin  and
Alenia Areonautica. 
15 The partnership of Lockheed Martin and Alenia Areonautica had been set at the time of
the  acquisition  of  the  C-130J  by  Italian  authorities  when  an  offset  agreement  was
reached to involve the U.S. company in the development and production of the C-27J.19
Conceived to replace the old medium-sized military transport aircraft G-222, the C27J
was to be part of an aerial triad alongside the C-130J and a future tanker (KC-767) to
sustain Italian military operations outside national territory. The deal was generally
well received by experts, who praised the Italian Armed Forces for the operation, which
allowed the acquisition of new modern aircraft while limiting expenses, thanks to the
support of the Ministry of Industry and the acquisition of the old G-222 by LMATTS.20
The new aircraft received its airworthiness military certificate in December 2001 and
was delivered to Italian authorities in 2005.
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16 Italy’s role in the European A400M program was strictly related to previous transport
aircraft  programs.  In  July  2001  five  EU  countries  –Belgium,  France,  Germany,  the
United Kingdom and Portugal– and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding
stating their intention to buy a number of A400Ms developed and produced by Airbus
Military.21 In  July  2000,  the  progressive  Italian  government  led  by  Prime  Minister
Giuliano Amato had decided to support the Airbus project with a potential acquisition
of  sixteen  aircraft.22 Nonetheless,  one  year  later  –in  December  2001–  the  newly
established conservative government led by Silvio Berlusconi reversed that decision,
causing the withdrawal of Italy from the program. 
17 The episode received national and international attention, and various explanations of
the decision were put forward. First, the Italian company Alenia was not satisfied with
the 8 percent work-share assigned for its eventual involvement in the program23 and
there was little room for manoeuvre to improve it since agreements already had been
signed with French, German and Spanish suppliers, while the C27J/C130J was seen as
promising industrial partnership with Lockheed Martin. The second explanation was
more political  and was based on the arguments put  forward by the Italian defense
minister, Antonio Martino: he said the aircraft was expensive and useless to the Italian
Air Force, which had already selected the U.S. C-130J and the C27J.24 Moreover, at that
time  the  future  European  transport  aircraft  was  still  just  a  plan,  while  the  U.S.
platforms were already developed. After strong reactions from major representatives
of  the  government  –namely  the  foreign affairs  minister,  Renato  Ruggiero–  and the
parliament, Martino reported to Parliament on the Airbus case in October 2001. 
18 The third component of the Italian Air Force’s aerial triad –besides the C130J and C27J–
is  the  Boeing  KC-767  tanker.  In  July  2000  Italian  authorities  issued  a  request  for
proposals  for  the  acquisition  of  a  new  tanker  aircraft.  At  that  time,  only  two
competitors had developed a tanker aircraft suitable to replace the old tanker air fleet:
the U.S. company Boeing, with its civilian 767, and the European consortium EADS, with
the  Airbus  A330.  Two  years  later  Italy  selected  Boeing  to  procure  four  KC-767s,
conceived for air refueling as well as for long-range troop transportation.25 Once more,
the Italian company Alenia Aeronautica was initially involved in the program as it was
responsible for converting the original civilian version of the aircraft –the 767, built in
Kansas– into the tanker variant.26 The preference for an American supplier over the
European  one  was  partly  motivated  by  the  fact  that  an  offset  deal  was  reached
concerning the assembly of the aircraft in Italy, although the offset proposed by EADS
was also significant.
19 The United States had already said it needed to replace its tanker fleet –which mainly
consisted of old KC-135s– but the U.S. Air Force officially requested the purchase of the
KC-767 only in early 2003, following evaluations concerning the costs and technical
capabilities  of  Boeing’s  tanker.  By  the  end  of  the  same  year,  irregularities  in  the
procurement process  started to  emerge,27 but  the Italian government confirmed its
intention to be the “first customer” of the U.S. tanker with the first delivery expected
in spring 2007. After various bureaucratic and legal problems, a new competition was
opened  by  the  U.S.  government,  and  in  February  2011  Boeing  was  announced  the
winner, acquiring a contract of approximately $35 billion. Italy received its first and
second KC-767 aircraft in January and March 2011, which were later deployed during
the Unified Protector operation in Libya. The fourth and last KC-767 was delivered in
2012.
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20 The medium extended air defense system (MEADS) is aimed to ensure mobile missile
protection from air threats for military or civilian sites and troops deployed on the
ground.  According to Italian official  documents,  this meets  both NATO’s  and Italy’s
requirements for flexible, interoperable, deployable and sustainable air defense.28 The
United States launched the requirement in 1989 and immediately looked for European
partners.  In  1995,  a  declaration  of  intent  was  signed by  the  United  States,  France,
Germany  and  Italy,  followed  in  1996  by  a  memorandum  of  understanding  on  the
program definition/validation phase. After France’s withdrawal, the memorandum was
modified  so  that  costs  were  divided  among  the  three  remaining  partners  in  the
following way: United States 60 percent, Germany 25 percent, and Italy 15 percent. The
procurement program is based on the principle of juste retour, which implies substantial
equality between each government’s investment in the program and the investment
return for its national defense industry. The memorandum envisages that each country
may  review  its  participation  in  subsequent  phases,  that  the  initial  cost  share  may
change, and that each partner country can leave the program.29 
21 In 1996, considering the importance attached by the Atlantic Alliance to air defense
against  ballistic  missiles,  the  program  was  enshrined  in  the  NATO  framework  by
creating  the  NATO  MEADS  management  agency.  In  1999  it  was  chosen  as  prime
contractor  in  the  MEADS  International  consortium  composed  by  Lockheed  Martin,
Daimler  AeroSpace  and Alenia  Marconi  System.  It  is  noticeable  in  this  regard  that
Italian (and German) industries are not subcontractors of the U.S. prime but part of the
joint  venture,  which acts  as  prime contractor.  After  a  $231.8 million risk  reduction
phase financed 55 percent by the United States, 28 percent by Germany and 17 percent
by Italy, in 2005 a $3.4 billion contract was signed between NATO MEADS management
agency  and  MEADS  International  for  the  system  development  and  demonstration
phase. The costs of this contract would be shared by the three governments on the
basis  of  the  same  percentage,  and  the  national  industries  part  of  MEADS  received
equally divided investments: 55 percent to Lockheed Martin, 28 percent to European
Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS30) and 17 percent to MBDA Italia.31 In particular,
MBDA  Italia  worked  on  missile  launchers,  reloaders  and  multifunction  fire  control
radar.
22 The MEADS system’s  preliminary design review was completed in  2008,32 while  the
system-level critical design reviews were passed and completed two years later.33 At
that  moment  representatives  of  the  management  agency  and  all  states  involved
evaluated the results of the design work positively and decided to advance towards
further system integration and a test phase. The first tactical operations centre and the
first launcher were delivered to MEADS International at the end of 2010.34 In early 2011,
the United States expressed its intention to cease participation because of rising costs
and severe cuts in the defense budget. Nevertheless, the U.S. government continued to
support MEADS development, as Pentagon officials declared that the three countries
involved in the program would be able to harvest technologies from it and upgrade
current missile  defense systems or use the technology for other purposes.35 MEADS
conducted its first flight test at White Sands missile range, New Mexico, in November
2011. In April 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel reassured Germany and Italy that
the United States would fulfill its commitment to fund the MEADS program through
fiscal year 2013. Congress allocated $380 million to the program, although the amount
is subject to a 10 percent reduction due to sequestration.36 
Relations between the United States of America and Italy in the post-Cold War...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 88 | 2014
6
23 Because  of  growing  opposition  to  the  program  by  U.S.  lawmakers,37 however,  it  is
possible that the United States will opt out of the program in 2014, leaving to Germany
and  Italy  the  responsibility  to  decide  if  and  how  to  continue  its  development.  On
September 2013 a senior Lockheed Martin manager said the Polish government had
proposed joining the program and that governments in the Middle East and Asia also
had expressed interest in MEADS. 38 
 
Italy’s participation in the U.S.-led F-35 procurement program 
24 The  F-35  procurement  program  deserves  specific  attention  because  of  its  military,
industrial and political importance. The program is aimed to deliver a fifth-generation
fighter aircraft with net-centric and stealth characteristics. Total U.S. investment in
the F-35 is nearing $400 billion to develop and procure 2,457 fighter aircraft by 2037.39
The  multinational  procurement  involves  Australia,  Canada,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,
Norway,  Turkey and the United Kingdom, while  Japan and Israel  have selected the
aircraft through the foreign military sale process. As a whole, around 3,000 aircraft are
set to be produced and sold worldwide. The five-year-long evaluation of the proposals
presented by two consortia, led respectively by Boeing and Lockheed Martin, ended on
26 October  2001  when  the  U.S.  Department  of  Defense  awarded  the  contract  to
Lockheed Martin. After a prolonged phase of system development, demonstration and
testing, the first aircraft were delivered to the United States and other members of the
multinational program.
25 The F-35 program changed the way allied countries such as Italy participate in a U.S.-
led  multinational  procurement.  In  fact,  they  were  involved  since  the  development
phase  through  a  number  of  bilateral  memoranda  of  understanding  within  the
framework memorandum covering the  entire  program.  The F-35  program does  not
formally  recognize  the  principle  of  juste  retour or  the  logic  of  offsets,  which  are
industrial compensations granted to partner or customer countries buying the defense
product.  The  F-35  procurement,  rather,  is  based on the  principle  of  best  value  for
money. In theory, industries from all partner countries compete to become suppliers of
the  U.S.  prime  contractor.  That  means  the  memoranda  do  not  envisage  the  exact
industrial  return  for  partners’  national  industries,  and  nor  do  they  prescribe the
workshare to match the costshare.40 In reality,  so far,  the economic contribution of
many allied governments is often roughly matched by the investment returns for their
national defense industry. A good example is represented by the Italian case.
26 Italy joined the program in 1998 with an initial investment of $10 million. According to
the report presented in 2002 by the Air Force chief of  staff, the F-35 perfectly met
national requirements and offered the best guarantees in terms of interoperability and
standardization  in  the  context  of  multinational  operations.41 In  2002,  Italy  and the
United States signed a bilateral addendum envisaging, among other things, an Italian
financial  contribution  of  $1,028 million  covering  2002-2013.42 In  2007,  the  Italian
government signed a new memorandum related to the next phases of the procurement
program, involving an Italian investment of $903 million.43 The undersecretary of state
at that time, Lorenzo Forcieri, declared at a hearing at the defense committee of the
Italian  Parliament  that  contractual  commitments  by  Lockheed  Martin  with  Italian
industries amounted to $1,018 million, with 10,000 workers expected to be employed in
various regions.44 In 2009, the Italian and U.S. governments agreed to build an assembly
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facility in Cameri (province of Novara, northern Italy), the only one outside the United
States, involving an Italian investment of $796 million. In 2012, the number of aircraft
to  be  purchased  was  reduced  from  131  to  90 45 because  of  the  austerity  policy
undertaken by the government led by Mario Monti.  However,  in 2012,  the national
armaments director, General Claudio Debertolis, confirmed that Italy’s acquisition of 90
F-35  was  needed  to  replace  253  aging  aircraft  introduced  in  the  1970s  and  ’80s,
including the Tornado, AMX and Harrier.46 This decision survived the Parliamentary
debate in 2013, when a motion was tabled to suspend the whole procurement program
in light of the economic crisis affecting Italy and later was rejected. 47
 
Italian penetration of the U.S. defense market
27 While the U.S. industrial presence in Italian markets dates to the aftermath of World
War II, Italian penetration of the American market is a recent phenomenon occurring
largely after the end of the Cold War. The Italian case is not unique in Europe: since the
1990s major European companies such as BAE Systems and EADS made efforts to bid for
U.S. Department of Defense procurement, for example by establishing subsidiaries or
joint ventures in the United States. At least four major examples are noteworthy with
regard  to  the  penetration  of  the  U.S. defense  market  by  Italian  defense  industries:
AgustaWestland’s  supplies  for  the  US101,  the  acquisition  of  DRS  by  Finmeccanica,
Fincantieri’s participation in the Littoral Combat Ship program and Beretta supplies to
the U.S. Army. 
28 In  July  2002,  Lockheed Martin and AgustaWestland signed a  ten-year  agreement to
jointly market, produce and support a medium-lift helicopter, the AW101, then named
US101, in the United States. In May 2003, AgustaWestland signed an agreement with
Bell  Helicopter  to  undertake  final  assembly  of  the  US101  in  the  United  States.
According  to  the  deal,  AgustaWestland  would  produce  the  main  rotor  blades  and
fuselage sections at its U.S. facility and other components, including the gearbox, at its
Italian facility. 
29 In December 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a request for proposals to
supply twenty-three helicopters to replace eleven VH-3Ds and eight VH-60Ns, which
provide presidential helicopter transportation. Two competitors responded: Lockheed
Martin-AgustaWestland  and  Sikorsky  Aircraft.  In  January  2005,  the  Department  of
Defense announced that it had selected the US101 by Lockheed/Augusta as the winner,
with  a  contract  value  of  $6.1 billion.  The  contract  foresaw  the  delivery  of  three
prototypes in 2007 and final delivery of all the helicopters by 2014. In July 2005, the
US101 was given the designation VH-71 Kestrel. However, following U.S. Navy requests
to add security and communication systems, the cost of the VH-71 program started to
rise, forcing Lockheed and AgustaWestland to meet new requirements, which caused
delays.48 As a consequence,  in February 2009 the Democratics asked that the VH-71
acquisition  be  revised.  The  program  was  definitely  cancelled  in  June  2009  despite
contrary  suggestions  by  the  U.S.  Navy49,  as  well  as  by  the  New  York  Times.50 The
cancellation took place notwithstanding a letter from the Italian minister of defense,
Ignazio La Russa, to his U.S. counterpart, Robert Gates.51 A new request for proposals
was issued in March 2010 52 and again in November 2012 by setting new requirements
for the program: the helicopter would carry fewer people and would have a shorter
range and simplified communications. Sikorsky seemed to be the only bidder.53
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30 In May 2008, Finmeccanica announced the acquisition of 100 percent of U.S. defense
company  DRS  Technologies.54 Based  in  Virginia,  it  is  a  leading  supplier  of  thermal
imaging  devices,  combat  display  workstations,  electronic  sensor  systems,  power
systems,  rugged computer systems,  air  combat training systems,  mission recorders,
deployable  flight  incident  recorders,  environmental  control  systems,
telecommunication  systems,  aircraft  loaders,  military  trailers  and  shelters,  and
integrated logistics support services.
31 The  total  amount  of  the  operation  was  estimated  at  $5.2 billion.  According  to  the
Finmeccanica  CEO,  Pier  Francesco  Guarguaglini,  the  acquisition  was  the  natural
outcome  of  Finmeccanica’s  emerging  role  in  the  U.S.  defense  market  after  the
involvement of  the Italian company in the US101 and C27J  procurement programs.
After  the  formal  announcement,  the  acquisition  was  completed  in  October  2008 55,
following approval by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and
the  defense  security  service  (DSS).56 This  acquisition  was  particularly  important
because  DRS  supplies  high-tech  and  very  sensitive  products  and  services  to  the
Department of Defense. 
32 In May 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense awarded Lockheed Martin and its partner
Fincantieri a contract to design, develop and produce two ships as part of the wider
littoral combat ship program which foresaw the acquisition of fifty-five ships by the
U.S. Navy for a total amount of $20 billion by 2020.57 Lockheed’s ship was named the
LCS-1, as General Dynamics was in charge of the development of another prototype
(LCS-2) within the same program. In 2007, the U.S. Navy decided to cancel construction
of the second LCS-1, as it had been impossible to reach an agreement with Lockheed
Martin  to  halt  the  increase  of  ships’  costs.  Nevertheless,  work  on  the  first  LCS-1
continued, as it was 80 percent completed by that date and almost ready for delivery.58
Within the context of the LCS program, Fincantieri acquired Manitowoc Marine Group
(MMG) and,  consequently,  its  plants  in Marinette,  Sturgeon Bay and Cleveland.59 In
doing that, Fincantieri entered the industrial phase of the program while increasing
the  company’s  possibilities  in  the  U.S.  defense  sector.  The  LCS-1,  christened
USS Freedom in  September  2006,  was  delivered  in  September  2008  and  officially
accepted by the Navy in October. In December 2010, the U.S. Navy commissioned ten
LCSs to Lockheed Martin and Fincantieri. The total amount of the contract was about
$437 million, with the possibility of adding another nine ships by 2015 and raise the
value of the contract to $4.5 billion in case of extra features.60
33 Finally, it is worthwhile recalling the case of the Italian arms company Beretta. One of
its major successes in the U.S. defense market dates to 1985, when U.S. Armed Forces
and state police forces started using the Beretta 92 series. In May 2002, a new contract
was awarded to the Italian company for 18,744 pistols to the U.S. Air Force. Finally, in
January 2009 Beretta won the largest U.S. handgun procurement program since World
War II, providing the U.S. Army with a total of 450,000 model 92FS pistols.
 
Legal aspects of procurement cooperation: MoUs and technical
agreements 
34 Defense procurement cooperation between Italy and the United States has relied on the
legal  framework  provided  by  a  number  of  agreements  and  memoranda  of
understanding. During much of the post-Cold War period, the two governments relied
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on  the  first  MoU  signed  in  September  1978,  entitled  “Concerning  the  Principles
Governing  the  Mutual  Cooperation  in  Research  and  Development,  Production  and
Procurement of Defense Equipment.” This agreement has never been ratified by the
Italian Parliament, as it was considered a technical deal rather than a result of political
negotiations.61 According  to  the  Italian  defense  minister,  Attilio  Ruffini,  the
memorandum  would  promote  harmonization  through  standardization  and
interoperability,  and would enable the gradual rebalancing of trade relations in the
defense sector, both in monetary and technological terms. The memorandum served as
a framework whose purpose was to achieve the best cost-effectiveness ratio in military
spending by encouraging the technological upgrade of the Italian defense industry and
export to third countries of U.S. defense equipment produced under license by Italy.62 
35 The 1978 memorandum has been one of the main pillars of Italy-U.S. defense industrial
cooperation.  However,  some concerns  emerged,  especially  regarding  the  significant
imbalance in  the defense trade penalizing Italy.  In  fact,  as  stated in  1984 during a
hearing  in  the  Italian  Senate  by  the  undersecretary  of  state,  Silvano  Signori,  the
defense trade ratio between 1975 and 1978 was 1 to 7 in favour of the United States.63
Such  a  critical  imbalance  was  due  to  several  factors,  including  the  greater
competitiveness of U.S. defense products, the difficulty for Italy to obtain profitable
cooperation  agreements  –often  characterized  by  a  low  technology  content  for  the
Italian defense industry– and U.S. export restrictions of defense equipment produced
by Italy under American license.64 Nevertheless, the memorandum paved the way for a
closer relationship between the two allies, as demonstrated by the fact that, after the
signing, Italian industries were selected to provide maintenance support to several U.S.
C-130s deployed in Europe and to SH-3 helicopters. 
36 The memorandum resulted from two different but complementary political needs. On
the one hand, Italy’s objective was to reduce the industrial,  technological and trade
gaps.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rationale  behind  the  U.S.  decision  to  sign  the
memorandum  was  part  of  a  broader  strategy  –strictly  correlated  to  the  Cold  War
context–  aimed  at  strengthening  the  defense  capabilities  of  the  NATO  allies  by
spreading  the  application  of  standardization  and  interoperability  principles  among
allied armed forces.65 
37 Following the memorandum, Italy and the United States signed further technical and
sectorial agreements covering the regulation of the defense procurement process and
industrial cooperation. For example, in October 2003 the “Declaration of Principles of
Enhanced Cooperation in Matters of Defense Equipment and Industry” was signed by
the Italian minister of defense and his American counterpart. The 1978 memorandum
was  not  legally  binding,  leading  to  discussions  inside  the  Italian  Parliament  about
whether or not to ratify it. Indeed, the question arose when the Italian government
decided instead to ratify the letter of intent/framework agreement in 2003 with law
no. 148,  thus  creating  a  discrepancy  between  Italian-U.S.  defense  relations  –
characterized by an absence of legal protection– and relations with European countries,
which relied on a legal framework established through a ratification process.66 
38 In 2005, efforts aimed at strengthening Italian defense exports achieved an important
political result. By subscribing to the so-called “blanket assurance agreement,” Italy
was allowed to re-export toward a third country –which in turn had signed the same
blanket assurance– military equipment imported from the United States without asking
for authorization but only by informing the U.S. Department of State within thirty days
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of delivery. This agreement conceals substantial political value as it reflects the will of
the Italian government to share responsibility for a multinational  system of  export
control related to sensitive military and dual-use material.67 
39 In 2006 there was significant consolidation of defense cooperation between Italy and
the United States. A first important step was the memorandum for “Meeting National
Defense Requirements – Security of Supply,” which went into effect on 1 August 2006.
This agreement implemented the “Meeting National Defense Requirements” section of
the  aforementioned  “Declaration  of  Principles.”  The  document  envisaged  the
establishment of a code of conduct to which Italian companies might voluntarily join
under  the  coordination  of  the  Italian  minister  of  defense.  In  brief,  the  agreement
established greater mutual  protection and a more effective procurement regulation
between the two countries.68 The Italian defense companies that joined the code of
conduct entered into a mutual guarantee system between Italy and the United States.69
In this way they were considered reliable suppliers to both the Department of Defense
as well as to any U.S. companies wishing to use them as subcontractors.70 In particular,
the  code  of  conduct  allowed  Italian  defense  companies  to  obtain  and  exploit  a
preferential access route into the defense priorities and allocations system, which is
used to prioritize national defense-related contracts/orders throughout the U.S. supply
chain  in  order  to  support  military,  energy,  homeland  security,  emergency
preparedness and critical infrastructure requirements.71
40 In 2006, two other technical agreements were signed. In August 2006 the deal entitled
“Regarding the Exchange of Engineers and Scientists” regulated and coordinated the
position  of  national  engineers  and  scientists  working  in  each  other’s  country.  One
month  later,  on  September 26,  the  “Research,  Development,  Test  and  Evaluation
Projects  agreement”  was  signed  to  regulate  collaboration  in  research,  testing  and
evaluation.  As  anticipated  in  the  introduction,  thirty  years  after  the  1978
memorandum, in 2008 Italy and the United States signed a new, ten-year umbrella
agreement concerning “Reciprocal Defense Procurement.” As a consequence, on 3 May
2009 –the date the memorandum went into effect– the previous 1978 agreement ceased.
72 Finally, the U.S. Department of Defense considers Italy as a qualifying country, which
theoretically implies an exemption from the Buy American act and Balance of Payment
Program according to federal acquisition regulations.73 
 
Political and strategic dimensions of the bilateral
relationship
41 Defense industrial relations between the United States and Italy should be considered
in the context of the military and political aspects of the post-Cold War era. First, in
this period Italy  demonstrated a  new,  significant  and constant  military  activism in
international missions, mostly –but not only– alongside the Americans. This activism
was linked to the enduring importance of bilateral relations with the United States for
Italy’s defense and foreign policy, which has been recognized by both conservative and
progressive Italian governments in the last  two decades.  The political  and strategic
dimension to a certain extent has shaped defense industrial relations, which in turn
played a role in influencing the former. 
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A new Italian military activism in international missions
42 First, let us look at the new, significant and constant military commitment of Italy in
crisis management operations alongside U.S. forces. In 1991, Italian military forces took
part in the Gulf War, including a naval group and Tornado ground attack fighters, and
the  Italian  Air  Force  commander  took  part  in  high-level  planning  meetings  with
officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. In 1993, 3,500 Italian troops were deployed in Somalia in the peace-keeping
mission led by the United States under United Nations mandate, experiencing the first
casualties in a military action since the end of World War II. Through the 1990s, Italian
armed forces operated in the western Balkans together with the Americans: Italy not
only provided air bases in 1995, but the air force made a small number of sorties and
the army was deployed within the NATO mission IFOR74 in the following period. Again
in 1999, Italy not only provided indispensable bases for the NATO air campaign against
the Serbian regime, but made the third-largest contribution to air sorties,  after the
United States and France, with forty-nine aircraft,75 172 bombings and the involment of
a navy task force including the carrier Garibaldi. In the aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attacks, the first Italian military personnel officially arrived in Afghanistan on
January 2002, and in October 2002 Italy decided to deploy 1,000 troops in Afghanistan
alongside U.S. forces even before NATO took a leading role in the country –the so-called
Task  Force  Nibbio.  After  NATO  took  over  command  of  the  International  Security
Assistance Force, Italy commanded the whole mission between August 2005 and May
2006. Italy has been in charge of NATO regional command west since its establishment
in 2006 76 and has maintained between 3,000 and 4,000 troops in Asia despite fifty-three
casualties among Italian soldiers through September 2013. In the case of Iraq, the lack
of a U.N. mandate or international consensus on Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as
strong domestic opposition, prevented Italy from taking part in the first months of
operations conducted by U.S.  forces,  with British support.  Yet,  after U.N. resolution
1483 of May 2003 –confirmed by resolution 1551 of October 2003– Italy deployed until
September 2006 between 2,000 and 3,000 troops in southern Iraq, particularly in the
city  of  Nasiriya,  the  second-largest  European  contribution  after  that  of  the  United
Kingdom.  Finally,  during  the  2011  NATO  Operation  Unified  Protector  in  Libya,  the
Italian Air  Force conducted 9 percent  of  air  sorties  –compared to  27 percent  of  the
United States, 21 percent of France, and 11 percent of the United Kingdom.77 As in 1999,
military bases on Italian territory proved to be fundamental to successfully manage the
six-months-long NATO air campaign against the Libyan regime.
43 Such military efforts took place within a broader Italian activism with regard to crisis
management operations, under NATO as well as the umbrellas of the United Nations
and the EU. During the 1990s Italy participated in more than twenty-five concurrent
missions per year, which peaked at thirty in 1999.78 In the 2000s, large-scale operational
commitments in Kosovo, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan led Italy to deploy on average
12,500 troops  abroad  per  year.  In  the  post-Cold  War  period,  participation  in  crisis
management operations traditionally has been considered a way to strengthen Italy’s
position and credibility within relevant multilateral organizations and fora such as the
United Nations, NATO, the EU and the G8.79 Already in the early 1990s, it become clear
that in the new phase of international relations after the Cold War, not being present in
military operations alongside the United States would be a handicap for Italian defense
and foreign policy.80 This is  linked to the widespread and deeply rooted perception
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among Italian policymakers that Italy has to constantly bolster its prestige among peer
nations and that military contribution to crisis management operations is a valuable
and effective tool to that end. Such participation was also deemed an important tool for
enhancing bilateral cooperation with major European and North American allies.  In
some  cases,  such  as  the  western  Balkans,  missions  abroad  were  also  aimed  at
addressing a direct security concern for Italy such as the flow of refugees through the
Adriatic, the creation of failed states where organized crime could find safe havens and
the  risk  of  regional  instability  just  a  few  kilometers  from  Italian  borders.  Finally,
participation  in  crisis  management  operations  has  been  useful  in  modernizing  the
Italian military and improving its interoperability with NATO allies. 
 
The enduring importance of bilateral relations with the United
States
44 However, Italian military commitment alongside U.S. troops was not just the result of
these factors. This commitment was, rather, a tool to maintain and enhance bilateral
relations  with  the  United  States,  which  has  been considered  the  bedrock  of  Italy’s
national security, as well as of the Italian system of alliances, since the end of World
War II.81 Being  surrounded  by  unstable  regions  –from  the  western  Balkans  to  the
southern Mediterranean shores– and unable to shape events in these regions on its
own, Italy traditionally has relied on asymmetric alliances with stronger partners such
as the United States to address common security concerns.82 The United States has been
considered by the Italian Republic as the main contributor to European security during
and  after  the  Cold  War.  Moreover,  bilateral  relations  with  Washington  have  been
deliberately pursued by Rome as leverage to enhance Italy’s status with more powerful
European countries such as France and –after reunification– Germany. This two-fold
approach  to  relations  with  the  United  States  continued  in  the  1990s,  despite  the
disappearance of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, because of the security crisis in
the Balkans and the Mediterranean as well as the kind of structural relations with other
EU members.83 In  the early  2000s,  the United States  remained a  crucial  variable  in
defining  Italy’s  security  interests  and  options  because  of  U.S.  influence  in  Italy’s
unstable vicinity, namely the Mediterranean and Middle East84. After the 2001 terrorist
attacks,  when  U.S.  national  security  priorities  shifted  from  Europe  to  the  greater
Middle East, the weight of European allies become increasingly valued in terms of their
political  and  military  contribution  to  U.S.-led  crisis  management  operations.85
Therefore,  Italian  participation  in  missions  abroad  become  a  fundamental  tool  for
Italian defense policy.86 
45 Because of Italy’s strategic interest in the European integration process, in the post-
Cold War period Italian governments have tried to balance this Atlanticist attitude with
Europeanist efforts. For example, Italy has constantly supported European cooperation
and integration not only in the economic domain but also in the political, security and
defense  realms.  However,  this  Europeanist  effort  has  been  traditionally  seen  as
complementary to NATO and not in opposition to strong transatlantic relations. Both
progressive and conservative governments in the post-Cold War period have agreed
that Italy should continue to maintain the two traditional pillars of  its  foreign and
defense policy: excellent relations with the United States and a firm anchor in Europe.87 
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46 In this context, the case of Italy’s military commitment in Iraq is noteworthy. In fact,
while U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and the western Balkans were managed within
a NATO framework and enjoyed wide European support, military intervention in Iraq
took place as a “coalition of the willing” and triggered a deep political divide among
Europeans. In 2003, the Italian government offered the United States political and –
later on– military support. The political support was epitomized, among other things,
by the letter to the Wall Street Journal signed by the heads of government of the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom in the run-up to U.S. military intervention. It was an important pro-
U.S. stance, at least in symbolic terms, to balance Franco-German opposition to the war.
88 That decision was taken by the conservative government led by Silvio Berlusconi, and
Italian military deployment in Iraq –around 3,000 troops– was maintained for three
years despite the attack on the Italian military base in Nasiriya, which killed nineteen
Italians on 12 November 2003.
47 The conservative governments led by Berlusconi in 1994, in the 2001-2006 period and
between 2008 and 2011, demonstrated a greater pro-U.S. attitude than the governments
led by progressive leaders in 1996-2001 and 2006-2008. Already in 1994, the foreign
minister, Antonio Martino, in a parliamentary speech on June 21 recalled as guiding
principles for Italian foreign policy first the “loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and to the
relations with the U.S.” and secondly “the economic and political cooperation within
the EU.”89 Franco Frattini, foreign minister of governments in 2002-2004 and then
between  2008  and  2011,  affirmed  that  his  government  was  increasing  U.S.-Italian
relations to higher levels than in the recent past.90 This Atlanticist attitude included a
strong personal relationship between the Italian prime minister and the U.S. president,
George W.  Bush,  as  demonstrated by the number of  summits  held in  Italy  and the
United States as well as by the rare opportunity provided to Berlusconi to give a speech
at the U.S. Congress in March 2006.91 But the personal relationship between the two
conservative politicians should not be overestimated with respect to the traditional
attitude of Italian governments to seek strong relations with Washington regardless of
the personality of the U.S. president. In fact, though Barack Obama had no personal
affinity  with  Berlusconi,  when  in  2009  the  Democratic  administration  called  for
European military support for its strategy in Afghanistan, the Berlusconi government
immediately  increased  the  Italian  contribution  to  ISAF  by  1,000 troops,  the  largest
European surge to the NATO-led operation at that time. 
48 This is not to say that Italian progressive governments did not attach great importance
to bilateral relations with the United States. It is true that leftist opposition parties
hindered the Italian mission in Iraq, and when they won the general election in 2006
the new government, led by Romano Prodi, immediately withdrew Italian troops from
Nasiriya. However, the Berlusconi government had already agreed to a similar timeline
for withdrawal in the previous months. Above all, the Iraqi case was an exception with
regard to progressive leaders’ support of U.S.-led crisis management operations in the
post-Cold War period. In particular with the Clinton administration (1992-2000) and the
Obama administration (2008-2013), Italian leftist politicians worked to enhance military
and  political  ties  with  the  United  States.  Indeed,  Italian  progressive  governments
confronted the radical left wing twice. 
49 First, from October 1998 until the end of the NATO air campaign in Kosovo and Serbia,
the government led by Massimo D’Alema struggled with the radical  wing of Italian
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progressive parties, within and outside his coalition government, over the decision to
support  the NATO operation.92 Italy’s  contribution was indeed crucial,  as  it  allowed
NATO to use a number of air bases. According to the foreign minister at that time,
Lamberto  Dini,  the  Italian  decision  to  accept  the  Alliance’s  activation  order  was  a
turning point with regard to both the domestic political situation and relations with
the  United  States  and  NATO.93 The  defense  minister,  Carlo  Scognamiglio  Pasini,
informed  the  defense  and  foreign  affairs  committee  of  both  the  Senate  and  the
Chamber of Deputies that in case of NATO military intervention Italy would ensure full
operational  and  logistic  support,  with  “full  and  unquestioned  membership  and
participation in the decisions and collective actions of the Alliance.”94 Italy’s role and
its relations with the United States were at stake. The anti-American attitude of part of
the Italian left was one of the main reasons for internal opposition to the war.95 The
first-ever  government  led  by  a  former  Communist  leader,  D’Alema,  contributed
strongly to the NATO campaign because it believed it was of great interest to Italy to
cultivate links with the United States.96
50 Eight  years  later,  in  2006-2007,  the  Prodi  government  –while  withdrawing  Italian
troops from Iraq– did not reverse the operational commitment in Afghanistan despite
the  increase  of  Italian  casualties.  Furthermore,  the  Prodi  government  supported
participation  in  the  F-35  procurement  program  by  allocating  1,028 million  euros97
notwithstanding opposition to the U.S.-led multinational acquisition. 
51 Generally speaking, in the post-Cold War period, on one hand the United States has
asked Italy –as well as other European allies– for more military support than in the
past, from the Balkans to the Middle East and Central Asia: this includes not just the use
of bases on Italian soil but also active deployment of troops and a range of military
assets from special forces to trainers, from fighter aircraft to light armoured vehicles.
On the other hand, Italy has been more willing and able than in the Cold War era to
provide this support, thanks to a bipartisan consensus among political elites that this
action served national interests by enhancing prestige, contributing to international
peace, and strengthening relations with the United States without weakening Italian
ties with Europe.98 
52 It is also worthwhile examining the role of the president of the republic. The analysis of
Italy’s constitutional and institutional framework is beyond the scope of this paper. We
will just highlight the fact that the 1948 Italian constitution assigns important powers
to  the  president,  including  the  right  to  appoint  prime  ministers  and  call  general
elections. With regard to defense and foreign policy, the president –who is also the
head of the armed forces– chairs the Supreme Defense Council. Particularly from 1999,
presidents  Carlo  Azeglio  Ciampi  (1999-2006)  and  Gorgio  Napolitano  (since  2006)
devoted  considerable  attention  to  foreign  and  defense  policy.  For  example,  Ciampi
balanced  the  Atlanticist  attitude  of  the  Berlusconi  government  with  explicit
Europeanist statements, but at the same time immediately took sides with the Bush
administration  over  military  intervention  in  Afghanistan  in  the  aftermath  of
September 11, 2001.99 With regard to military intervention in Iraq, Ciampi took a much
more  cautious  approach than the  Berlusconi  government  and worked to  make  the
Italian military contribution dependent on and legitimized by a U.N. resolution. He also
chaired the Supreme Defense Council on 18 March and 14 April 2003. 
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The linkage between the politico-strategic and the defense
industrial dimensions
53 It  is  difficult  to  assess  the  linkage  between  military  and  political  support  for  the
American  administrations  by  Italian  governments  in  the  post-Cold  War  period  and
defense industrial relations between the United States and Italy. However, three main
points can be fairly argued. 
54 One of  the  main reasons  Italy  made constant  efforts  to  enhance defense  industrial
cooperation  with  its  American  counterparts  was  the  strategic  importance  of  the
relations with the United States. This was particularly obvious during the Cold War, but
has  applied  also  to  the  post-Cold  War  period.  The  fact  that  different  Italian
governments have negotiated and signed a number of MoU and technical agreements
with  the  United  States  demonstrates  this  willingness  to  anchor  defense  industrial
relations to a solid political and legal framework. The preference for American defense
products  and  U.S.-led  procurement  programs  is  based  not  only  on  military  and
industrial considerations but also on the transatlantic rationale of enhancing relations
with Washington.  For  instance,  this  has  been the case  with the F-35,  which Italian
governments have supported over the last fifteen years. There are four main reasons
for this. First, the military rationale, the understanding that the F-35 is necessary and
fits  the  requirements  for  both  the  Italian  Air  Force  and  the navy.  Second  is  the
industrial  rationale,  based on the strategic interests of the Italian defense industry.
Third  is  the  multinational  rationale,  the  desire  by  Italian  policymakers  generally
speaking to pursue defense policy in multinational  frameworks.  Last,  but  not  least,
there  is  the  transatlantic  rationale,  namely  the  importance  attached  by  Italy  to
bilateral relations with the United States and with NATO.
55 In the case of the C27J, the decision to favor the American procurement program over
the A400M was partly the result of the low level of pro-European enthusiasm by the
parties  forming  the  Berlusconi  government  coalition  in  2001.  According  to  the
diplomatic advisor of the president of the republic at that time, this euro-scepticism
was epitomized by the relations between Berlusconi and his foreign minister, Renato
Ruggiero,  who  was  appointed  in  May  2001  and  resigned  in  December  2001  in
disagreement with the government. The decision to skip the A400M program was one
of the reasons which led Ruggiero to resign, as the pro-European minister considered it
seriously harmful to European defense integration. Considering the examples of the
C130J and C27J transport aircraft, as well as the KC-767 tanker, it can be argued that
under the Berlusconi governments defense industrial cooperation between the United
States and Italy has been pursued more than in the past, and more so than cooperation
with other European countries. 
56 However, the critical approach to Europe by Italian conservative parties in that period
should  not  be  overstated.  First,  already  in  the  mid-1990s,  new  moderate  and
conservative parties such as Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale worked to enter the
European People’s Party and did not see a European vocation and the American alliance
–as well  as a greater degree of national autonomy over foreign policy– as mutually
exclusive  alternatives.100 Second,  a  certain  European  commitment  by  conservative
parties in the early 2000s was illustrated by the fact that the Berlusconi government
managed to host in Rome the signing of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004 –in the
very same room where the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. 
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57 It  can  also  be  argued  that  the  political proximity  between  the  Italian  and  U.S.
governments created a favourable atmosphere for the Italian defense industry in the
United States. Generally speaking, in the defense market government-to-government
agreements and lobbying by homeland military and political authorities is even more
important  than  in  other  industrial  sectors  subject  to  export  support  by  national
governments.101 Customers of defense products are other states, mostly the military but
also security forces, and therefore the reassurance provided by the state where the
defense supplier is located is extremely important. In the field of defense industrial
cooperation, credibility and reliability of industrial and military partners are achieved
through mid- to long-term efforts, as well as continuity in defense policy.102 Inversely, if
the  United  States  considers  an  ally  to  be  leaning  towards  pacifism,  neutrality  or
opposition with respect to American military operations abroad, the most important
technology transfers or valuable defense industrial cooperation become more difficult
to achieve.103 This  is  particularly true with the United States,  which is  used to link
commercial  policy,  including  the  openness  of  its  domestic  market,  to  foreign  and
defense  policy,  particularly  to  bilateral  relations  with  single  allies.  That  means
Finmeccanica needs the backing of Italian governments to gain the trust of foreign
governments eligible to buy its products.104 The fact that Italian military forces were
deployed with Americans in a number of missions abroad, including special operations
and counter-insurgency campaigns in  Iraq and Afghanistan,  as  well  as  the pro-U.S.
stance  of  Italian  governments  on  most  international  issues,  played  a  role  in
strengthening the credibility of Italy as a staunch ally of the United States as well as a
reliable supplier of defense equipment. In addition, the good relations between George
W.  Bush  and  Silvio  Berlusconi  between  2001  and  2006  played  a  role.105 Generally
speaking, Italian conservative governments have paid more attention than previous
ones  to  the  promotion  of  Italian  exports,  partly  because  of  the  entrepreneurial
background of Berlusconi himself –although first steps in this regard were undertaken
by  progressive  governments  in  the  late  1990s.106 This  led  to  a  number  of  visits  by
representatives of major Italian companies such as Finmeccanica, ENI and ENEL not
only  to  the  United  States  but  also  to  Russia  and  Arab  countries.  The  Berlusconi
governments,  particularly Foreign Minister Franco Frattini,  also tried to reform the
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make it more supportive of Italian exports. With
particular regard to the United States, it is noteworthy that the Italian ambassador,
Giovanni Castellaneta, was appointed to the Finmeccanica board in 2004 and was then
nominated to head the Italian embassy in Washington, D.C., while maintaining his role
within  the  company.  Finmeccanica  decided  to  ride  this  political  trend  to  seek
penetration  in  the  U.S.  defense  market,  as  it  did  in  the  late  1990s,  with  the  pro-
European attitude of Italian progressive governments by taking part in the integration
and rationalization process of the aerospace and defense industry.
58 However, this positive political environment cannot be considered the only driver of
defense industrial cooperation between the United States and Italy. In particular, in the
case  of  the  Marine  One  helicopter,  the  AgustaWestland  platform  at  that  time  was
widely  recognized  as  the  most  competitive  product.  Cooperation  in  procurement
programs and supply security is a long-term effort which spans decades; negotiations
to replace the 1978 U.S.-Italian bilateral agreement on defense procurement initiated at
the beginning of the 1990s and was finalized only in 2008. This long-term character
increases the role of high-level civil servants, both military and civilian, who work over
the years on the various procurement dossiers, in contrast to politicians, who may hold
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the post of defense minister only briefly. This is particularly true for Italy, where the
constitutional settlement centred on Parliament, rather than on the executive, coupled
with the fragmentation of the political party system often leads to government crisis
and cabinet changes. Moreover, in the case of procurement programs of high-tech and
complex  systems,  military  officials  and  defense  industry  managers  have  extremely
valuable technical know-how. In addition, within the military, joint deployment and
training with the U.S. Armed Forces creates an incentive to procure the same or at least
interoperable  equipment  through  transatlantic  rather  than  European  procurement
programs. Generally speaking, the military and diplomatic bureaucracies –like others
in the Italian state– have a certain degree of influence over elected politicians. As a
result, once they hold a government post, political leaders tend to take positions more
in line with traditional Italian foreign and defense policy then when they were out of
the government.107 
59 A third point can be made on the influence of defense industrial cooperation on the
politico-strategic dimension of U.S.-Italy relations. Generally speaking, since the end of
World War II, strategic industries such as ENI and later ENEL and Finmeccanica played
an  important  role.108 Certainly,  the  creation  of  a  large  defense  company  like
Finmeccanica in the 1990s represented an important novelty, because for the first time
U.S. industries had an interlocutor in the private sector with sufficiently large turnover
and  portfolio  to  become  a  partner  and  not  only  a  supplier.  That  helped  create
partnerships  and  increased  the  relevance  of  the  defense  industry  within  overall
bilateral  relations.  Moreover,  the  substantial  autonomy  enjoyed  by  the  CEOs  of
Finmeccanica –particularly but not only Lina and Guarguaglini– meant that company
strategies  were  first  largely  shaped  by  management  and  then  shared  with  Italian
governments. At the same time, the fate of one of the few large Italian manufacturing
companies,  directly  employing  70,000 workers  and  sub-contracting  with  dozens  of
small  and  medium  companies  in  Italy,  was  obviously  highly  considered  by  Italian
policymakers in conducting defense and foreign policy. In this context, it is interesting
to note  the preference for  U.S.  and U.K.  markets  by Guarguaglini  compared to  the
cooperation with France and Germany sought by his  predecessor as  Finmeccanica’s
leader, Alberto Lima. 
60 An analysis of Italy-U.S. relations through the evolution of the defense industry offers a
very  interesting  picture  of  the  continuity  of  Italian  foreign  policy,  with  some
evolutionary  aspects.  It  also  indicates  that  the  strategic  nexus  of  the  Cold  War,  a
partnership based on the defense of the West against the Eastern threat,  has faded
away. Today we have a mix of regional security and economic interests that allow us to
describe  the  relationship  in  realistic  terms.  But  Italy’s  transatlantic  anchor,  which
could also be described as its American prism, is still vivid even if European ties have
increased much more than transatlantic  ones.  There is  still  much to say about  the
Italian penchant towards Washington. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article analyzes U.S.-Italian relations after 1989 from a defence-industrial perspective. It
argues  that  the  concentration  and  internationalization  of  the  Italian  defence  industry,
particularly through the creation of Finmeccanica, influenced bilateral relations by introducing a
new  element  into  defence  industrial  cooperation  between  the  two  countries.  Military
procurement programs involving American and Italian governments and industries,  based on
several memorandums of understanding, have become an important component of transatlantic
relations. In turn, these programs are influenced by the broader military and political relations
between  the  United  States  and  Italy,  which  have  been  particularly  intense  regarding  Italy’s
contribution to U.S.-led crisis management operations in Europe, Central Asia and the greater
Mediterranean. The paper argues that there is a two-way relationship between defence industrial
cooperation and politico-military cooperation.
Cet article présente une analyse des relations entre les États-Unis d’Amérique et l’Italie depuis
1989  vues  sous  l’angle  de  l’industrie  de  la  défense.  La  concentration  et  le  développement
international  de  l’industrie  italienne  de  la  défense,  avec  en  particulier  la  création  de
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Finmeccanica, a fait évoluer la relation bilatérale en introduisant un élément nouveau dans la
coopération  industrielle  entre  les  États-Unis  d’Amérique  et  l’Italie.  Les  programmes  de
fournitures  militaires  auxquels  participent  les  gouvernements  et  industriels  américains  et
italiens  se  basent  sur  plusieurs  accords-cadres  et  sont  devenus  un  élément  important  des
relations  transatlantiques.  Cet  élément  est  également  influencé  par  les  relations  bilatérales
militaires et politiques. Il s’agit de relations intenses marquées par la participation de l’Italie à
des  opérations  de  gestion  de  crise  en  Europe, Asie  centrale  ainsi  que  dans  la  région
méditerranéenne. En conclusion, l’article montre comment s’articule une relation à double sens
dans laquelle la dimension de coopération dans l’industrie de la défense et celle politico-militaire
se correspondent. 
INDEX
Keywords: military procurement, defence industry, transatlantic relations, crisis management
operations, F-35
Mots-clés: fournitures militaires, industrie de la défense, relations transatlantiques, opérations
de gestion de crise, F-35
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